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This paper discusses  a proposed framework for the safe integration of small unmanned 
aerial systems (sUAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The paper examines the 
potential uses of sUAS to build an understanding of the location and frequency of potential 
future flight operations based on the future applications of the sUAS systems. The paper 
then examines the types of systems that would be required to meet the application-level 
demand to determine “classes” of platforms and operations. Finally, a framework is 
proposed for both airworthiness and operations that attempts to balance safety with utility 
for these important systems. 
Nomenclature 
UAS = Unmanned Aircraft System 
NAS = National Airspace System 
sUAS = small UAS 
 
I. Introduction 
here has been a tremendous upsurge in the desire for small, Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) to be able to 
freely access the National Airspace System (NAS). In order to assess the need and possible impact on the NAS, 
it is imperative to investigate three basic questions. First, what is the demand for sUAS from an application and 
usage standpoint? Two, what are the potential benefits of broad sUAS access in terms of an economic benefit 
analysis as well as benefits to the public good? Three, what are the roadblocks to broad access from regulatory, 
safety, and infrastructure concerns? Finally, it is also beneficial to postulate a path forward to address the current 
roadblocks which will potentially open the broadest access for sUAS. 
 
 
II. Application Demand 
To determine the potential demand for sUAS system access, it is important to address both the applications for 
which sUAS can be used as well as the potential users of these systems and their impacts on the using communities. 
Broadly speaking, these applications and user communities can be broken into two main application objectives, 
namely, those being used for commercial purposes and those being used in the service of the “public good”. (Note 
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that there can be some overlap between applications when, for example, a regulatory requirement of a public agency 
is carried out by commercial firms.) 
  
A. Commercial Applications 
For the potential commercial uses of sUAS, it is easiest to target those applications for which there has already 
been a demand expressed. These include: 
 - Aerial photography and GIS 
 - Agriculture and crop surveys 
 - Outdoor advertising and banner towing 
 - Security services 
 - “Fly by” services (meter reading, aerial inventory, etc.) 
 - Entertainment and recreation 
 - Research and Development 
 - Fish spotting 
 - Training 
Once airspace access has been opened to commercial users, it is likely that other applications will appear which have 
not been considered. 
B. Public Use applications 
In terms of sUAS used in the service of the “public good”, there are again several applications for which there 
has already been an expressed demand. These public use aircraft currently must obtain a Certificate of Authorization 
from the FAA in order to operate as a public UAS.  In terms of simple present demand, the FAA has indicated that 
80% of the active CoAs for 2011 are for sUAS. The types of public operations which could be of great value 
include: 
 - Law enforcement (Federal, state, and local) 
 - Support to first responders (firefighters, HAZMAT) 
 - Traffic monitoring 
 - Pipeline and infrastructure monitoring (which may be conducted by commercial firms) 
 - Disaster response 
 - Weather observation and Earth Science 
 - Environmental monitoring (air quality, runoff, etc.) 
 - Regulatory and taxation 
 - Research and Education 
 - Wildlife management 
 - Wildfire detection and support 
 - Department of Defense (DoD) 
 
III. Economic Impact 
The economic impacts of sUAS usage can be categorized into four bins, the gross business base and/or 
employment from the users conducting such operations, the business base and/or jobs created by the suppliers of the 
systems to end users,  the increase in GDP and employment associated with any net improvement in existing 
production or business base that can be reasonably attributed to use of sUAS, and a net increase in GDP or 
employment from totally new businesses that are created as a result of sUAS access to the NAS. Note that for a 
given commercial application, there may be some from all four bins whereas for public applications there may be 
fewer areas of increased economic impact. 
A.  Commercial Applications 
The economic impact of sUAS operations from commercial enterprises can be estimated by looking at the 
potential user base and estimating what level of activity may result from their use of sUAS. For example, the 
Department of Agriculture, in its 2007 Census of Agriculture data, indicates that there are approximately 1.3million 
harvested cropland farms (out of 2.2million total farms) comprising some 310 million acres. These farms would be 
the most likely candidates to use sUAS systems to improve crop yields.  Part of the attraction for sUAS to perform 
this function is that roughly half (46.3%) of the 1.3 million farms are 200 acres or less in size. These farms are 
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unlikely to be able to afford larger systems, even if used in aggregate or a timesharing arrangement. If just 10% of 
the 1.3 million farms begin to use sUAS systems, this would create a need for roughly 26,000 sUAS systems per 
year. This would create roughly 6500 jobs for sUAS manufacturing and as many as 2600 jobs in “for-hire” sUAS 
operations. This could translate to a roughly half a billion dollar industry segment. In addition, if the use of sUAS 
could only provide a 1% improvement in across-the-board crop yield improvement nationwide, this would translate 
into a $1.43billion increase in the value of the crops sold. Note that from a regulatory standpoint, smaller farms 
could use low altitude, relatively short endurance platforms to make use of the technology whereas larger farms 
would need to be able to fly higher, faster, and beyond line-of-sight to take similar advantage. Although hard to 
quantify the benefits, potential reductions in the use of fertilizers, pesticides, etc. by the use of small UAS could 
provide a vast improvement in the local ecosystems of many of the farms which take advantage of the technology. 
Compiling the impacts from the other sUAS applications listed above yields similarly large results. 
B.  Public Use Applications 
Similarly, the public use applications are also numerous. Looking at just one example, there are approximately 
19,000 independent Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies located throughout the US. According to the 
Us Department of Justice’s 2007 Census of Law Enforcement Aviation Units (CLEAU), of 941 “large” agencies 
(over 100 sworn officers) surveyed, only 21% currently have a manned aviation unit. The median expenditure for 
these aviation units was roughly $1.5million. In addition, the average cost per flight hour for maintenance and fuel 
was $99 for fixed-wing and $242 for helicopters. In considering what the potential usage for law enforcement could 
be, one recent survey indicated that roughly half of the 19,000 agencies are currently considering the use of sUAS 
when the regulations permit widespread use. Assuming that 75% of the “large” agencies and only 25% of the 
“small” agencies opt to use sUAS, this would mean approximately 4200 units per year would be needed. It is likely 
that many “operators” would be police officers cross trained in sUAS operations and thus the number of “new” 
operator jobs would likely be roughly 2000 nationwide. There are also some operations which, while “public” may 
actually be conducted by private firms such as pipeline monitoring. There are currently some 880,000 miles of 
drinking water pipelines in the US, according to the EPA. In 2009, the American Society of Civil Engineers 
estimated that these pipelines lost some 7 billion gallons of water per day compared to 43 billion gallons per day 
actually used or roughly 15%. If the water loss percentage could be reduced by a mere 1% using sUAS to reduce 
leak detection times, this would reduce lost water expenditures by some $2.5billion. Surveying the pipelines which 
are above ground and/or with leak detection easily visible would likely require some 500 sUAS platforms for a 
once-per-day search. According to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) data, 
some 3000 companies operate 175,000 miles of onshore and offshore Hazardous Liquid pipelines; 321,000 miles of 
onshore and offshore Gas Transmission and Gathering pipelines and 2,066,000 miles of Natural Gas Distribution 
mains and service pipelines. Although these pipelines must be inspected regularly, PHMSA only has 113 full-time 
pipeline inspectors and relies heavily on state inspectors and the companies operating the pipelines themselves to 
maintain their safety. Pipeline monitoring is often quoted as an obvious use for UAS. For gas and hazardous liquid 
pipelines, leak detection via UAS would need to be done at very low altitude (~200ft) for direct, in-situ 
measurements to be effective. Even “remote” sensing for the types of materials being carried are most effective at 
less than 1000ft. Monitoring these pipelines would require some 1500 sUAS units just to cover the vast distances 
required. As a result, there would be a need for some 400 units per year and nearly 2000 jobs created for operations. 
Other local public users include between 26,000 and 30,000 independent fire departments in the US staffed by 
both professional and volunteer firefighters. Note that roughly 70% of these fire departments are all volunteer. 
Typically, when a fire department responds to a fire, there is a period of time required to conduct a situation 
assessment of the nature and extent of the fire as well as develop a plan of attack. It is extremely rare that these 
firefighters have any type of “birds eye view” camera or infra-red measurements to help with this assessment. In 
some cases, this lack of situational awareness has directly contributed to the deaths of firefighters, such as the deaths 
of two firefighters in Chesapeake, Virginia. Having a sUAS available to provide real-time video for the 480,000 
structure fires in the US every year would provide a much-needed safety improvement. Similarly, having better 
direct information would likely reduce the damage to structures owing to a shorter evaluation time and better 
allocation of firefighting resources. If only a 1% reduction in damage due to fire occurs, this results in a loss savings 
of $108million per year.  While most of the fire departments that serve large metropolitan areas would likely take 
advantage of the technology, smaller departments may not be able to do so. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to 
consider that if 25% of the smaller departments and 50% of the larger departments make use of sUAS, this would 
result in sales of roughly 3000 units per year and a total job creation of roughly 2100. 
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C. Economic Impact Summary 
In summary, the economic benefit from relatively unrestricted sUAS operations is substantial. The total 
economic impact from unrestricted sUAS NAS access could be over $8billion per year with a net job creation of 
over 34,000. In addition, the societal benefits from improving the environment and our understanding thereof, 
supporting law enforcement, first responders, and other public agencies as well as promoting aerospace education is 
profound. 
 
IV. Operational Framework 
 
A.  Operational Tempo 
In terms of usage, the previous section detailed the general types of application demand. From this, it is 
reasonable to conclude that there are applications for sUAS in remote, rural, suburban, and urban areas. Using the 
application demand figures, if each potential platform averages one use per day, it is possible that sUAS operations 
could well exceed 200,000 per day throughout the country or over 75 million operations per year. 
 In addition, the DoD has indicated in their NAS Integration report for 2010 that there are presently 146 UAS 
personnel units at 63 locations throughout the US. By 2015, the DoD expects to have 197 UAS units at 105 
locations needing some 275,000 flight hours per year in the NAS for training and proficiency/currency. Although 
this number includes all classes of UAS, the Army has indicated that of the slightly more than 1,000,000 UAS hours 
since 2001, over 300,000 were for sUAS. This would indicate that some 82,000 flight hours or 164,000 operations 
per year would be conducted by DoD using sUAS. 
 The FAA has indicated that of the currently active public operator CoAs issued, some 80% are for sUAS 
operations. This would indicate a clear bias on the part of public (Federal, state, and local) agencies to use sUAS 
versus their larger counterparts. 
Clearly, the level of NAS access granted to sUAS will determine both the level of utilization and the impact on 
the NAS itself. This level of access consists not only of the geospatial constraints (where and at what altitudes) but 
also what equipage will be required, if any. 
B.  Regulatory Framework 
The current rules for NAS access comprise both “airworthiness” (e.g. 14 CFR 23, 25 for aircraft) as well as 
“operations” (e.g. 14 CFR 91 and others). However, in considering what rules may or may not be applicable to 
sUAS it is instructive to keep in mind that the current regulations are predicated on two basic premises: First, that 
aircraft should be made safe for their occupants and Second, that aircraft should be operated so as to keep them from 
colliding with one another to prevent harm to both sets of occupants. With sUAS, there are no occupants. Therefore 
the primary focus of much of the highly detailed proscriptive nature of many of the regulations is irrelevant or not 
applicable to sUAS. 
However, taken as a whole, the current regulations can provide some insight into a “level of risk” that is already 
assumed by current NAS users that could be utilized as a potential framework for sUAS inclusion. Another potential 
issue not generally addressed by current regulations is the potential risk to ground personnel and property. This 
would clearly be more important to sUAS since many of the applications being considered involve low altitude 
operations in and around urban areas. 
One consideration that often creates exceptional debate is the question of “How ‘small’ is small?”. Rather than 
attempt to create a definition directly, it might be possible to create some categories of “small” based upon certain 
risk levels already in the current regulations.  
First, it is reasonable to postulate that there exists a size of sUAS that is so small that it presents almost no 
potential risk or hazard to either other aircraft or ground personnel no matter where it operates or who operates it. 
There is presently no data that would definitively identify the upper limit of what this size, weight, and/or kinetic 
energy might be. Testing sUAS of different types colliding with aircraft components, ground “targets” and 
instrumented anthropomorphic dummies would provide this limit. 
The next potential category involves looking at existing regulations for potential insight on current collision risk 
hazard abatement. The existing Part 23 regulation calls for a bird-strike windshield protection requirement of 2lb. 
The existing Part 25 regulations call for bird strike resistance of 4lb. to the windshield, 8lb. to the engine and 
airframe. Further, Part 101 defines a “free balloon” and indicates: 
“(4) Except as provided for in §101.7, any unmanned free balloon that— 
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(i) Carries a payload package that weighs more than four pounds and has a weight/size ratio of more than three 
ounces per square inch on any surface of the package, determined by dividing the total weight in ounces of the 
payload package by the area in square inches of its smallest surface; 
(ii) Carries a payload package that weighs more than six pounds; 
(iii) Carries a payload, of two or more packages, that weighs more than 12 pounds; or 
(iv) Uses a rope or other device for suspension of the payload that requires an impact force of more than 50 
pounds to separate the suspended payload from the balloon.” 
These existing rules define a “level of hazard” that is associated with birds and free balloons in terms of a 
collision hazard that is currently an “assumed risk” for users of the NAS. It is possible to use similar verbiage to 
construct a sUAS rule that would allow sUAS to be similar in weight and density to the existing free balloon 
payloads, i.e., 12lb. total, no single component more than 6lb. and no component more dense than 3oz./in^2. This 
would provide an adequate size for a large variety of small UAS operations described in earlier sections. 
Part 101 also proscribes certain limits on the locations from which free balloons may operate and other 
operational limitations. However, many of these operational limitations are due to the lack of maneuverability and 
control of the balloon’s trajectory, which would not be an issue with sUAS. If such characteristics were taken into 
consideration, it is likely that this size sUAS could operate in large classes of airspace without equipage or other 
constraints as they would pose no more of a hazard than free balloon payloads. In addition, since birds typically are 
unpredictable, they represent more of a hazard to current NAS users than sUAS operations as sUAS operations 
would be controlled either autonomously or via human operator. 
The FAA issued an Advisory Circular, AC-91-57, that has been used as the basis for operations of many “model 
aircraft” operations since 1981. This voluntary compliance document suggests that model aircraft operations restrict 
their altitudes to 400ft. or less, and if within 3 miles of an airport, to notify the airport operator or cognizant ATC 
facility. Note that AC 91-57 does not have any size limitation specifically called for. Many current model aircraft 
operations regularly exceed 400ft. AGL and many model aircraft clubs operate at airports/airfields and have done so 
safely for decades. One of the most prominent model aircraft organizations, the Academy of Model Aeronautics 
(AMA), has a member safety code. This code calls for models to generally be 55lb. or less, although a “waiver” 
process exists to allow models up to 100lb., to be flown at AMA sanctioned airfields and events. Furthermore, the 
AMA also has an active “turbine waiver” program that provides turbine powered model aircraft, some of which can 
fly up to 200kts., to also operate under AMA rules and insurance coverage. However, there is presently no published 
data that indicates that operating under such a safety code can be directly attributed to any specific increase in safety 
nor is there any data to support a lack of such a safety code would cause a reduction in net safety. Furthermore, there 
is a general lack of data concerning the reliability of COTS systems and subsystems that could be used in a safety 
hazard risk analysis. This includes COTS autopilot reliability and navigational accuracy, command and control link 
reliability, particularly in urban areas when using unlicensed bands, servoactuator reliability, motor and battery 
reliability, video link stability, ground station reliability, many of which are Windows based computers, system-
level reliability, and others. 
All present model, sUAS hobbyists, and “toy” aircraft flyers yield right-of-way to manned aircraft and suspend 
operations when manned aircraft are in the vicinity. This presents a rulemaking dilemma. Generally, in the manned 
aircraft rules, slower, less maneuverable aircraft have the right of way over faster. Thus, gliders must yield to 
balloons, powered aircraft must yield to gliders, faster aircraft must yield to slower, etc. The sUAS interaction with 
manned aircraft whereby sUAS yield to manned aircraft is a convention not due to a specific rule requirement 
(although it is suggested in AC 91-57) but reflects the reality that it is far easier for a ground based operator to see 
and avoid a large manned aircraft than it is for a manned aircraft to see and avoid a sUAS. Specific experiments 
need to be conducted to determine the ability of manned aircraft pilots to detect and discern the intent of sUAS 
under a variety of conditions. Only when such ability is quantified can a rule and its impact on other NAS users’ 
ability to see-and-avoid be assessed to any significant degree. This is particularly true when the “avoid” part of the 
rule may differ from existing convention, such as would be the case with sUAS yielding to manned aircraft. 
Attempting to discern an “upper limit” on what defines a “small” UAS is also difficult. Current NAS users 
include Part 103 Ultralight operations. For these operations, empty weight is generally limited to 254lb. With a pilot 
and fuel, this represents a vehicle of some 500lb. in weight that can be travelling up to 60kt. airspeed. Note that there 
are relatively few restrictions on where ultralight aircraft may operate since they may operate in virtually any 
airspace class “with permission” and are specifically excluded from many of the rules constraining Part 91 
operations. Typically, these operations are conducted during daylight (or civil twilight if equipped with anti-
collision lighting) and may not be operated over ill-defined “congested areas”. In addition, there are no requirements 
for airworthiness, registration, or pilot aeronautical knowledge. Clearly, this represents the “upper limit” of the 
current risk/hazard in terms of vehicle size and kinetic energy. It also helps define at least one boundary, by 
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exclusion, of what size potentially non-airworthy vehicle should NOT be allowed to fly directly over people (since 
flight over open-air assemblies are prohibited under Part 103). Note also that for experimental certificated aircraft, 
there are relaxed restrictions once a certain number of hours of successful flight have been demonstrated by the 
aircraft. It is reasonable to consider that some form of “proof time” might be appropriate for larger sUAS that wish 
to fly over populated areas. As a “reinforcement” to this upper limit possibility, some foreign aviation authorities are 
considering 150kg. (330lb.) as an upper limit to what is considered “small”. It is clear that an arbitrary limitation for 
what defines the upper limit of small is neither desirable nor defensible. 
C.  Operational Framework 
 
It is conceivable that there would be varying levels of access for sUAS based upon credible risk assessments and 
mitigations of those risks. For example, a property owner should be allowed to operate a “small” UAS over their 
own property up to an altitude of 500ft. This would be consistent with allowing the operator, such as a small farm, to 
assume an “acceptable” risk if they so choose. Also, since manned aircraft are constrained by regulation to maintain 
a minimum altitude above people and structures, there would be very little likelyhood of collision with other NAS 
users. Similarly, in urban areas, small UAS could operate at or below the surrounding building heights (or up to 
250ft. above – similar to tethered balloons) without likelihood that a manned aircraft would be present. Model 
aircraft and hobbyist operations would continue as they are currently conducted with the same suggested 400ft. 
operating altitude (with higher altitudes allowed under controlled conditions). Operators of sUAS under these 
circumstances would not be required to undergo the same medical and testing that manned aircraft pilots currently 
do. 
For other operations, risk could be mitigated by a variety of means. Primarily, those sUAS whose size and 
weight make them inherently safe should be allowed unrestricted access to the NAS. As the size and kinetic energy 
increases, there would need to be a corresponding increase in the control reliability to ensure that the vehicle is 
under positive control at all times (either performing its mission, performing a flight termination, or navigating 
directly to a pre-determined safe rally point). Exactly what these risk levels are and what risk mitigations can be 
applied needs to be the subject of a vigorous research effort. 
Equippage would also need some investigation. For most operations of sUAS, there would be little benefit to the 
requirement for equipment such as ADS-B or a sense-and-avoid system. However, in the case of using sUAS for 
higher altitude operations, such equipage may be necessary to enter certain classes of airspace. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
Small UAS have a broad base of both commercial and public use applications. If relatively unrestricted access to 
the NAS is granted, the potential economic impacts could be enormous. Further, it is likely that many sUAS 
operations can be conducted in a safe and effective manner with no regulation. Other operations should only be 
regulated to the level of risk they pose to other NAS users and ground personnel and property. 
 
